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Note
COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS: JOINING POLICY AND
PROSE TO FOSTER A GOOD FAITH ANALYSIS
THERESA E. DURANTE ∗
In the technical game of induced patent infringement, subjectivity
plays a significant role. 1 Traditionally, defendants accused of patent
infringement present a layered defense, asserting both that the patent is
invalid and not infringed. 2 Increasingly, however, alleged infringers
include claims of good faith, yet misguided, beliefs of noninfringement and
invalidity. 3 When effectively argued, these types of affirmative defenses
negate the intent requirement, carefully crafted by the legislature and
judiciary, necessary to impose liability for induced patent infringement. 4
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, 5 the United States Supreme
Court restricted the extent to which subjectivity shields induced
infringement liability. 6 The Court held that a belief regarding patent
invalidity, even one asserted in good faith, is not a defense to a claim of
induced infringement under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act.7
The Commil Court correctly rejected this good faith defense in an
effort to streamline induced patent infringement claims and deter future

© 2016 Theresa E. Durante.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank her editors Aryeh Rabinowitz, Robert Baker, and Laura Merkey for their
time and thoughtful insight throughout the writing process. She also would like to thank Professor
Grimmelmann for lending his guidance and subject matter expertise. Lastly, the author dedicates
this Note to her parents, Steven and Elizabeth Durante, her sisters, and Will Pierce for their
constant love, encouragement, and humor.
1. See infra Part II.C.
2. Nathan A. Sloan, Think It Is Invalid? A New Defense to Negate Intent for Induced
Infringement, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 613, 613 (2013) (relying on Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co.,
412 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. Id.
5. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015).
6. Id.
7. Id. Section 271(b) provides that, “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
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inducers who attempt to game the defense.8 Despite reaffirming its holding
in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 9 the Supreme Court did not
root its analysis in preserving the level of intent required for induced
infringement liability. 10 Instead, the Court focused on the distinction
between “validity” and “infringement.” 11
Although the issues are
structurally separate in the Patent Act, scholars argue that dividing validity
and infringement is counterintuitive, given their seemingly intertwined
existences. 12
The Court could have strengthened its holding by incorporating the
policy rationales underpinning the purposes of Section 271(b). 13 These
rationales would provide clarification of the existing intent requirement,
equitable protection for patentees and the free marketplace, and facilitation
of the cross-application of intellectual property doctrines. 14 With this
approach, the Commil holding, inclusive of both substantive law and public
policy, could have furthered courts’ understanding of both induced patent
infringement and the intellectual property market as a whole. 15
I. THE CASE
Commil USA, LLC (“Commil”) is the patent holder for a method of
implementing short-range wireless networks. 16 The patent (“‘395”)
specifically relates to the use of time synchronization in order to provide
faster and more reliable communication between base stations and mobile
devices in a network area. 17
In 2007, Commil brought claims of direct and induced infringement of
the ‘395 patent against its competitor, Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), a
8. See infra Part IV.
9. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that in order to impose
liability for induced infringement, the inducer must have knowledge that the patent exists and that
the induced acts would cause infringement. Id. at 2068.
10. See infra Part III.
11. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.A−C.
15. See infra Part IV.B−C.
16. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated,
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). Wireless local area networks (“WLANs”), also known to the public as
“WiFi,” provide access points to connect laptops and other mobile devices to the Internet. WiFi
connections between base stations and mobile devices require users to remain relatively close to a
base station, and thus are short-range. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896).
17. Commil, 720 F.3d at 1364. Patent ‘395 is directed to wireless networks too large to be
covered by a single base station (e.g., universities and large corporate buildings). The claimed
technique would enable users of mobile devises to move seamlessly throughout the network
coverage area. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920
(2015) (No. 13-896).
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major supplier of WiFi access points and controllers. 18 On May 17, 2010, a
jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
found Cisco liable for direct infringement and awarded Commil $3.7
million in damages. 19 Following a motion filed by Commil, a second trial
was held with respect to induced infringement allegations. 20 In September
2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Commil, resulting in a final
amended judgment granting the company $63.7 million in actual
damages. 21
Cisco appealed the district court decision on several grounds. Cisco
contended that the district court both improperly instructed the jury and
erroneously precluded Cisco from presenting evidence of its good faith
belief in the invalidity of the patent. 22 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded the trial for further proceedings. 23 In its majority decision, the
court concluded that the district court erred in instructing the jury that Cisco
could be liable for “induced infringement based on mere negligence where
knowledge is required.” 24 Furthermore, the court held that a “good-faith
belief of invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced
infringement” and thus is evidence to be considered by the fact-finder. 25
The dissent argued that belief as to the invalidity of a patent is
irrelevant to the fact and law of infringement. 26 “Such a belief, even if held
in good faith, does not negate infringement of a valid and enforceable
patent.” 27 The dissent contended, however, that this belief “may be raised
as a defense to willfulness of the infringement.” 28 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether a good faith belief in invalidity is a
defense to induced infringement under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act. 29
18. Commil, 720 F.3d at 1364.
19. Id. at 1365.
20. Id.
21. Id. The final judgment also granted $10.3 million in prejudgment interest and $17,738 in
costs. Id.
22. Id. Cisco also presented five other arguments: 1) the district court abused its discretion in
granting a new trial; 2) the district court misconstrued the term “short-range communication
protocol;” 3) there is insufficient evidence to sustain infringement; 4) Commil’s claims are
indefinite, not enabled, and lacking adequate written description; and 5) the damages award based
on Commil’s royalty base violates the entire market value rule. Id.
23. Id. at 1364.
24. Id. at 1367. The disputed jury instruction permitted the jury to find inducement if “Cisco
knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual infringement.” Id. at 1366
(quoting Joint Appendix at 6389, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (No. 2012-1042) (line numbers 98:24–99:2)).
25. Id. at 1368−69.
26. Id. at 1374 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1373.
29. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts have historically struggled with uniformly articulating and
applying the knowledge requirement for induced infringement liability. 30
Prior to the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, the concept of induced
infringement originated as a tool to infer intent for claims of contributory
infringement. 31 The conduct and knowledge alleged to induce infringement
ranged from mere sale of a patented component to active encouragement of
infringing behavior. 32
These conflicting definitions of induced
infringement reflected the judiciary’s simultaneous effort to balance
interests of patent holders and that of the free marketplace. 33 Disparate
holdings eventually prompted legislative action to clarify the limits of
contributory infringement in 1952.34
Despite codification of induced infringement in the Patent Act, courts
remained divided over the requisite knowledge and intent for a defendant to
be held liable for inducement.35 In 2011, the Supreme Court finally settled
this ongoing debate in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A. 36 Borrowing
heavily from copyright law, the Global-Tech Court established a dual
requirement by which the defendant must have knowledge of both the
patent and infringement by a third party. 37 Equipped with this new
framework, courts presently face the task of navigating good faith defenses
and their implications on the knowledge requirement of Section 271(b). 38
Given the frequent overlap of patent, copyright, and trademark law, a
comparison of knowledge requirements for inducement among intellectual
property is helpful in analyzing courts’ current approaches to good faith
defenses. 39
A. Indirect Infringement Functioned as Evidence of Contributory
Infringement Before 1952
Prior to legislative action in 1952, indirect infringement functioned as
evidence of contributory infringement. 40 Courts initially determined

30. See infra Part II.A−B.
31. See generally Thomson-Houston Elec. v. Ohio Brass, 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897) (noting
that liability for contributory infringement will attach to defendants inducing or promoting
unlawful combinations of patented products).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
37. Id. at 2063.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part II.D.
40. See infra Part II.A.1.
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liability by examining potential uses of the alleged infringing product and
active inducement by the defendant. 41 Over time, however, liability for
contributory infringement attached only to a defendant with the requisite
knowledge. 42 This element aided courts in not only targeting culpable
parties but also curtailing the monopoly of patent owners over unpatented,
unrestricted components and materials.43
1.

Extension of Contributory Infringement Liability to Protect
Patent Holders

Early judicial decisions preceding the Patent Act categorized
infringement as either “direct” or “contributory.” 44
Liability for
contributory infringement was developed “under a theory of joint
tortfeasance, wherein one who intentionally caused or aided and abetted the
commission of a tort by another was jointly and severally liable with the
primary tortfeasor.” 45 Consequently, model instances of contributory
infringement occurred when a third party sold a component in a patented
invention that lacked any noninfringing uses. The primary case of Wallace
v. Holmes 46 established that one who makes or sells an unpatented
component for the sole use in a patented combination or process can be held
liable for infringement. 47 The complainants’ patent in Wallace was for an
improved lamp that consisted of a burner and a glass chimney. 48
Defendants argued that because they only made and sold the burner, they
could not be held liable.49 The circuit court found, however, that the burner
was not only the distinguishing feature of the lamp but also was “utterly
useless” standing alone. 50 In addition, the defendants exhibited their
burner, furnished with a chimney, and recommended it to customers, thus
“inducing the unlawful use of the complainants’ invention.”51
Decisions following Wallace continued to impose liability where a
component was useful only in a patented combination.52 In cases involving
41. See infra Part II.A.1.
42. See infra Parts II.A.1−2.
43. See infra Part II.A.2.
44. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468−69 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 1469 (first citing Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721
(6th Cir. 1897), and then citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202–05 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1898)).
46. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id. at 79.
49. Id. at 78−79.
50. Id. at 79.
51. Id. at 80.
52. See, e.g., N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (“One who
makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination will be
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts . . . .”).
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components capable of both infringing and innocent uses, however, courts
have found intent of contributory infringement only if the defendants
engaged in active inducement, such as instructions or advertising. 53 For
instance, the circuit court in Weed Chain Tire Grip Co. v. Cleveland Chain
& Manufacturing. Co. 54 issued a preliminary injunction where defendants
placed in the market, and advertised in circulars, a chain grip that was
“substantially identical” to plaintiff’s patented grip.55 Conversely, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Edison Electric Light Co. v. Peninsular Light,
Power & Heat Co. 56 dismissed an action for patent infringement against a
company that supplied electrical power “suitable for a great variety or
methods of use” and sold by the defendant without intent that “it was to be
used in an infringing way.” 57
In Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Railway Specialty
Co., 58 the Connecticut Circuit Court extended the “intent” element of
contributory infringement to include knowledge and indifference as to the
consequences of one’s acts. 59 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit inferred a proposed concert of action
between the Kelsey Company and the infringers given that the defendants
were willing “to sell to any and all purchasers, irrespective of their
character as infringers.” 60 Moreover, the court in Kelsey asserted that
defendants have a “duty of careful investigation” as to the character of their
purchasers and “an abandonment of indifference as to whether they are
seeking” to infringe upon the rights of the patent owner. 61
Ambiguities embedded in the Kelsey decision surfaced in the 1898
case of Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, signaling the first restriction
of contributory infringement liability. 62 The court observed that “[t]he
doctrine that one who furnishes materials, knowing their proposed use [is a
tort], becomes thereby a tortfeasor . . . is certainly novel.” 63 Rather, the
court argued, joint and several liability depends “upon the meaning attached
53. See, e.g., Graham Paper Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 46 F.2d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 1931) (finding
liability where a defendant made “sales of mulch paper adapted for use in accordance with the
methods covered by both patents, and was expressly recommending and explaining to purchasers
how to make use of the paper in accordance with those methods”).
54. 196 F. 213 (C.C.D. Ohio 1910).
55. Id. at 214–15.
56. 101 F. 831 (6th Cir. 1900).
57. Id. at 833.
58. 72 F. 1016 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896) (relying on Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450 (C.C.N.Y.
1886)).
59. Id. at 1018.
60. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co.,75 F. 1005, 1008 (2d Cir.
1896).
61. Id. at 1010.
62. 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).
63. Id. at 202.
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to the words ‘participation,’ ‘aiding,’ and ‘abetting.’” 64 The court
concluded that the knowledge element of contributory infringement
included knowledge of not only the physical destination of the infringing
product but also of the patent. 65 Moreover, “a defendant will be restrained
only . . . after it has been judicially determined” that the patent is valid and
his action is a tort. 66
2. Curtailment of Contributory Infringement Liability to Balance
the Rights of Patentees and the Free Marketplace
Gradual efforts by courts to curtail the monopoly of patent owners
over unpatented components and materials accompanied adjudications of
contributory infringement claims in the twentieth century. 67 Courts began
to start protecting “the free sale and use of unpatented articles of trade and
commerce.” 68 Before 1917, courts extended contributory infringement
remedies to the enforcement of patent restrictions on the use of unpatented
materials and supplies.69 The Supreme Court affirmed this notion in Henry
v. A.B. Dick Co. 70 Although the Court opined that inferring liability from a
mere sale of potentially infringing components “would block the wheels of
commerce,” it nevertheless held liable a licensee who violated use
restrictions of a patented device. 71 Five years later, however, the Supreme
Court overruled Henry, recognizing its potential to grant patent owners an
unbridled monopoly. 72 In Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 73 the Court held:
[T]he exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to
the invention described in the claims of the patent and . . . it is not
64. Id.
65. Id. at 203.
66. Id. at 205.
67. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co., v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917) (“[T]he patentee receives nothing from the law which he did not have before, and that the
only effect of his patent is to restrain others from manufacturing, using or selling that which he
has invented. The patent law simply protects him in the monopoly of that which he has invented
and has described in the claims of his patent.” (first citing United States. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167
U.S. 224, 239 (1897); then citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424
(1908); and then citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913))).
68. Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739 (2d Cir. 1924).
69. See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296 (6th
Cir. 1896) (“The monopoly in the unpatented staple results as an incident from the monopoly in
the use of complainant’s invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of the patentee’s control
over the use of his invention by others.”).
70. 224 U.S. 1, 31−32 (1912).
71. Id. at 48–49. The complainant sold his patented “Rotary Mimeograph” under a license
restriction that the machine be used only with unpatented stencil paper, ink, and other supplies
sold by the complainant. Id. at 11.
72. Motion Picture Patents Co., v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
73. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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competent for the owner of a patent by notice attached to its
machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but
which are no part of the patented invention . . . . 74
Despite this holding, the doctrine of contributory infringement
continued to be misconceived and misapplied.75 Congress enacted the
Patent Act in 1952 after the Supreme Court in Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co. urged Congress to “define the appropriate limits of the
doctrine of contributory infringement.” 76
B. Following the Patent Act of 1952, Courts Uniformly Imposed a
Knowledge Requirement for Induced Infringement
The Patent Act’s division of indirect liability into induced Section
271(b) infringment and contributory Section 271(c) infringement aimed to
stabilize and clarify the law. 77 Section 271(b) provides that, “[w]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 78
Although Section 271(b) does not incorporate “the word ‘knowingly,’ [the
Federal Circuit] uniformly imposed a knowledge requirement.”79
Generally, courts looked for a “specific intent,” rather than mere knowledge
of possible infringement by others, to prove contributory infringement. 80
This intent, however, materialized in different forms among the circuit
courts, which remained divided over the requisite level of intent.81 After
decades of diverse decisions, the Supreme Court resolved the split in

74. Id. at 516.
75. See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (calling for the definition of the appropriate limits of the doctrine of
contributory infringement to prevent its further misapplication).
76. Id.
77. See generally Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 203−04 (1980)
(“[A]lthough the general purpose of the Act was to clarify existing law, it also included several
changes . . . . In explaining the provisions of § 271, the Reports stated that they were intended ‘to
codify in statutory form the principles of contributory infringement and at the same time [to]
eliminate [the] doubt and confusion’ that had resulted from ‘decisions of the courts in recent
years.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952))).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
79. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (first
citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and then citing C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Water
Techs. Corp., 850 F.2d at 668 (“Although section 271(b) does not use the word ‘knowing,’ the
case law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement.” (citing 4 D. CHISUM,
PATENTS §§ 17.-04[2], [3] (1984))).
80. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s
infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
inducement.”).
81. See infra Part II.B.1.
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Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., concluding that induced
infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement. 82
1. A Lack of Clarity Exists in the Federal Circuit Regarding the
Required Level of Intent
While the “specific intent” element of Section 271(b) was firmly
established in case law, “there [remained] a lack of clarity concerning
whether the required intent must be merely to induce the specific acts or
additionally to cause an infringement.” 83 This splinter arose from two 1990
Federal Circuit decisions reaching contrasting results: Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 84 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
Inc. 85
In Hewlett-Packard, defendant Bausch & Lomb sold a license for an
infringing product to a third party and indemnified that party for patent
liability. 86 Subsequently, Hewlett-Packard sued Bausch & Lomb for
induced infringement. 87 The court opined that while Section 271(b) does
not mention intent on its face, “proof of actual intent to cause [infringing
acts] is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.” 88 Manville,
on the other hand, articulated a stricter standard.89 The inducement claim
arose after an employee at Paramount circulated a drawing of the plaintiff’s
patented product, which was subsequently used by the defendant to make
and sell the infringing product.90 In rejecting the claim, the court found that
knowledge of the alleged infringing conduct was insufficient; rather, “[t]he
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions
induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions
would induce actual infringements.” 91
Federal Circuit and district court opinions continued to struggle with
this division of authority up until, and even after, the en banc DSU Medical

82. See infra Part II.B.2.
83. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(first citing Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553; and then citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1424, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
84. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
85. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
86. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1467.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1469 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
89. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id. at 553 (first citing Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668; then citing Hewlett-Packard, 909
F.2d at 1468–69; and then citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 488 (1964)).
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Corp. v. JMS Co. 92 decision in 2006. 93 Plaintiffs DSU Medical Corporation
and Medisystems Corporation held a patent for a guarded, winged-needle
assembly that reduced the risk of accidental needle-stick injuries. 94
Defendants sold an identical needle guard, but as a “stand-alone” product
without a needle attached.95 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the Manville standard. 96 Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that the
alleged infringer knew of the patent and that she knew or should have
known her actions would induce actual infringement. 97 The court in DSU
Medical ultimately held that although the defendant was aware of plaintiffs’
patent, it had relied on advice from both the U.S. patent counsel and
attorneys that its product was noninfringing. 98 Therefore, the defendant
lacked specific intent.99 In formulating this conclusion, the court also relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in a case of induced copyright
infringement, Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 100 In Grokster, the Supreme
Court asserted that, “[t]he inducement rule . . . premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.” As such, specific intent is
evidenced by “affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” 101
2. Resolution of the Intent Requirement in Global-Tech
In the 2011 decision Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the
Supreme Court addressed Section 271(b) for the first time and concluded
that induced infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.102 The facts of the case surround a “cooltouch” deep fryer patented by SEB S.A. 103 In 1997, Sunbeam Products,
Inc., a U.S. competitor of SEB, commissioned Global-Tech Appliances’
Hong Kong subsidiary, Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to supply it with deep
fryers meeting certain specifications.104 Pentalpha copied the cosmetic
features of an SEB fryer and sold the product to Sunbeam; in turn, Sunbeam

92. 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
93. See, e.g., Jamison v. Olin Corp.-Winchester Div., No. 03-1036-KI, 2005 WL 7213838, at
*12 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2005) (“But what is it that the inducer must have intended? Quite remarkably,
this remains, in Federal Circuit jurisprudence and elsewhere, the major unanswered question about
§ 271(b).”).
94. DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1297.
95. Id. at 1298.
96. Id. at 1304.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1307.
99. Id.
100. 545 U.S. 913 (2005); DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1305.
101. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
102. 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
103. Id. at 2063.
104. Id. at 2064.
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resold them in the United States at a lower price point.105 For inducing
Sunbeam to infringe, SEB brought suit against Pentalpha. 106
In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that both the statutory text
and case law lack a definitive articulation of the knowledge requirement. 107
The Court ultimately invoked its decision in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (“Aro II”), 108 which is now a fixture of
contributory infringement. 109 In Aro II, the Supreme Court held that a
violator “must know ‘that the combination for which his component was
especially designed was both patented and infringing.’” 110 Considering the
historical connection of contributory and induced infringement, the GlobalTech Court felt compelled to apply the same knowledge requirement for
Section 271(c) to 271(b). 111 Accordingly, the Court held that induced
infringement requires knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement. 112
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the proper doctrine to
determine knowledge is that of “willful blindness” developed in criminal
law. 113 The doctrine requires that: (1) “the defendant . . . subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists” and (2) that “the
defendant . . . take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”114
Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant can be said to know the
critical facts that translate into the requisite intent for induced
infringement. 115

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2065.
108. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
109. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
110. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2068.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2070 (first citing United States v. Perez–Melendez, 599 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2010);
then citing United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477–78 (2d Cir. 2003); then citing United
States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010); then citing United States v. Schnabel, 939
F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991); then citing United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir.
2005); then citing United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380–81 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
then citing United States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1997); then citing United States
v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004); then citing United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913,
917, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); then citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir.
1983); then citing United States v. Perez–Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994); and then
citing United States v. Alston–Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 339–41 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
115. Id. at 2070−71.
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C. Subjective Good Faith Defenses May Negate the Requisite Intent
for Induced Infringement Liability
A demonstration of a good faith, subjective belief by the defendant
may preclude a finding of liability for induced infringement. 116 Many of
these subjective defenses stem from good faith yet misplaced reliance on
advice of counsel as to noninfringement and invalidity of a patent. 117
Ultimately, a court will consider the defense, if at all, under a totality of the
circumstances standard. 118
1. Advice of Counsel
Parties invoking subjective belief as a defense to infringement liability
often rely on advice of counsel. 119 In order to demonstrate a lack of the
requisite intent to infringe, a party need “not only to show an opinion from
competent counsel [as to noninfringement or invalidity] but also that it had
exercised reasonable and good faith adherence to the analysis and advice
therein.” 120 In the same vein, “intentional disregard of . . . counsel’s
opinion negates any inference of good faith, placing [a party] in the same
position as one who failed to secure the advice of counsel.”121 Moreover,
parties who fail to “obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the
initiation of any possible infringing activity” or proceed upon a biased
opinion will have trouble demonstrating good faith reliance.122
For example, the court in Manville found that Paramount’s actions did
not amount to knowledge, given that the company was “not aware of
[plaintiff’s] patent until suit was filed, and that [its] subsequent infringing
acts continued upon . . . [a] ‘good faith belief,’ based on advice of counsel,
that [its] product did not infringe.” 123 Similarly, the court in DSU Medical
Corp. held that since defendants demonstrated reliance on opinions of noninfringement from U.S. patent counsel, they did not believe or intend to be

116. See infra Part II.C.1−2.
117. See infra Part IV.C.1.
118. See infra Part IV.C.2.
119. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 109 F.R.D. 121, 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (“The central issue on which . . . testimony [from counsel for Universal] would have been
relevant was whether Universal initiated this action in ‘good faith.’”).
120. Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
121. Id. (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 665 (10th
Cir. 1980)).
122. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (first citing Gen. Elec., Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073–74 (1969); and then citing
Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967)).
123. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1989)).
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infringing. 124 On the other hand, the court in Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A.
Hormel & Co. found the defendant Hormel liable for induced infringement
after it consciously disregarded recommendation by counsel to create a
product substantially different from the patented product.125 The court
opined that Hormel, although on notice of Central Soya’s patent rights,
ignored its affirmative duty to exercise due care and thus possessed
sufficient intent to infringe.126
While not as prevalent as opinions of noninfringement, advice of
counsel as to patent invalidity has also surfaced in several decisions. In
Kolmes v. World Elastic Corp., 127 the Middle District of North Carolina
asserted that defendants, who after consulting counsel maintained a good
faith belief in the invalidity of the patent in suit, “did not possess the
requisite specific intent . . . for actively inducing infringement.” 128
Moreover, the district court in VNUS Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Diomed
Holdings, Inc. 129 denied summary judgment of induced infringement where
“each defendant . . . offered evidence that it sought and obtained the opinion
of counsel, who . . . provided an opinion . . . [that] the patents were
invalid.” 130 Although advice of counsel regarding noninfringement or
invalidity weigh in favor of a determination of good faith, many courts do
not think reliance on advice of counsel is dispositive. 131
2. Totality of the Circumstances Standard
Reliance on competent legal advice is only one of several steps
potential infringers must take to exercise due care and thus demonstrate the
good faith of their actions. 132 A consideration of the totality of the
circumstances is necessary “in determining whether a reasonable person
124. 471 F.3d 1293, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl
USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 649 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding opinion of counsel regarding noninfringement “admissible, at least with respect to [defendant]’s state of mind and its bearing on
indirect infringement.” (citing DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1307)).
125. 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
126. Id.
127. No. 4:93CV00719, 1995 WL 918081 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Kolmes
v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at *10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994)).
129. No. C-05-2972 MMC, 2007 WL 2900532, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007).
130. Id. at *1; see also DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Comput. Corp., 887 F.Supp.2d 999,
1012−13 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (indicating that a belief of invalidity may present a triable issue of fact
as to intent to induce infringement).
131. Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
132. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1969)
(recognizing that “a good-faith opinion by competent and independent patent counsel may be
important evidence to be weighed on the issue of ‘honest doubt’ of patent validity” but it was not
conclusive (first citing Cont’l Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 362 F.2d 123 (7th Cir.
1966); and then citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg., Co., 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir.
1960))).
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would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that the courts might
hold the patent invalid” or conduct noninfringing. 133 The court in Ecolab,
Inc. v. FMC Corp. 134 found such reasonable belief where the accused party
regarded its product as falling outside the scope of the patent. 135 Therefore,
the jury reasonably concluded that Ecolab lacked the intent required for
induced infringement. 136 Similarly, defendants in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v.
Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc. 137 avoided liability because they reasonably
believed their product was an invention freely found in the public
domain. 138
3. Negative Opinions Regarding Good Faith Defenses
Several decisions purport a complete eradication of subjective belief
from the intent analysis. By following the standard set forth in HewlettPackard, the district court in Sandisk Corp. v. Lexar Media, Inc.139 rejected
Lexar’s argument that a plaintiff must prove as a matter of law that the
defendant subjectively believed its actions were infringing. 140 In Nordberg
Manufacturing Co. v. Jackson Vibrators, Inc.,141 the defendant claimed that
although he was aware of the patent’s existence, he did not know his
operations infringed on those protected rights.142 The court doubted the
proposition that liability for contributory infringement could be avoided
when an alleged infringer “arrives at its own independent judgment on the
legal question of non-infringement;” this would leave a patentee
unprotected until the conclusion of litigation.143 These decisions reflect
how some courts may view subjective, good faith defenses as liability
loopholes and thus resist their implementation.

133. Cent. Soya Co., 723 F.2d at 1577 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
134. 569 F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
135. Id. at 1351.
136. Id.
137. 554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 1025; see also Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145917, at *21−22 (C.D. Ca. Oct. 2, 2013) (finding defendants’ subjective belief of
noninfringement held in good faith given the numerous other methods available to perform the
patented process).
139. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D.Cal. 2000).
140. Id. at 1335.
141. No. 63 C 2250, 1967 WL 7708 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1967), rev’d, 393 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.
1968).
142. Id. at *7.
143. Id.
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D. Intent for Induced Infringement and Applicability of Good Faith
Defenses Within Patent Law Function Similarly in Copyright and
Trademark Law
Intellectual property law—patent, trademark, and copyright law—
share similar approaches to both induced infringement and good faith
defenses. 144 Like patent law, trademark and copyright law demand a
showing of “specific intent” to impose liability for induced infringement. 145
Moreover, the merit of subjective, good faith defenses aid courts in
determining the “willfulness” of alleged infringers. 146
1. Intent for Induced Infringement in Copyright and Trademark
Law
Cases of copyright and trademark induced infringement demand a
similar level of knowledge to impose liability. 147 For instance, legislative
history of the Copyright Act supports that mere “evidence of reproduction
or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement.”148 Upon passage of the 1997 amendment,
Senator Hatch clarified that, “‘willful’ ought to mean the intent to violate a
known legal duty.” 149 In the aforementioned Grokster opinion, the
Supreme Court adapted the inducement rule to impose liability on
distributors whose words and deeds “show[] a purpose to cause and profit
from third-party acts of copyright infringement.” 150 The Grokster Court
clarified that such purpose cannot arise from mere knowledge of a product’s
characteristics or that it might be put to infringing use, but rather a higher
level of intent. 151
In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Liu, 152 recently explored the intent requirement for trafficking counterfeit

144. See infra Part II.D.1−2.
145. See infra Part II.D.1.
146. See infra Part II.D.2.
147. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420−21 (1st Cir.
2007) (“[C]opyright liability could be premised on a theory of active inducement of infringement,
so that ‘one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.’” (quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913, 936−37 (2005))).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012). See generally 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13,
1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting that the Act does not intent to include persons who
honestly believed they were not infringing).
149. 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
150. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
151. Id. at 935.
152. 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013).
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labels. 153 The defendant Liu commercially replicated CDs and DVDs on a
large scale without permission from the copyright holder.154 Nevertheless,
the court declined to impose liability. 155 The government could not prove
that the “defendant knew he was acting illegally rather than simply that he
knew he was making copies.” 156 Despite acknowledging “the general
rule . . . that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense,” the Liu
court opted for a higher intent requirement. 157 Given that average citizens
may not readily comprehend the complicated structure of modern statutes
and regulations, the government must prove “specific intent.”158
Trademark cases have similarly extended liability “beyond those who
actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.” 159 Despite lacking
direct control over the chain of distribution, manufacturers and suppliers
who intentionally induce others to infringe a patent will be contributorily
responsible for any resulting harms. 160 This intent required in trademark
law falls at a lower standard than patent and copyright law. A finding of
induced infringement in trademark will impute liability to defendants
supplying “its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement.” 161
2. Good Faith Defenses
While defenses premised on subjective belief rarely preclude liability
in cases of copyright and trademark infringement, such defenses do play a
central role in determining the “willfulness” of a defendant’s conduct. 162
Exceptional cases in which a defendant engages in “‘malicious,’
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful’” conduct may result in attorney’s fees
for the prevailing party. 163 Attorney’s fees are inappropriate, however,

153. Id. at 985.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 989 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991)).
158. Id.
159. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982).
160. Id. at 853−54.
161. Id. (first citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 285 U.S. 526 (1924); and
then citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946), aff’d,
162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1946)).
162. See, e.g., Buca di Bacco, Inc. v. Buca di Bacc’, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 31, 32 (S.D. Tex.
1993) (“[A] case may not be exceptional, even when deliberate copying occurs, if ‘the party
presents what it in good faith believes may be a legitimate defense.’” (quoting CJC Holdings, Inc.
v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60, 66 (5th Cir. 1992))).
163. Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1305
(5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 697
(5th Cir. 1992)).
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“where the infringer believed in good faith that he could lawfully use the
plaintiff[’s]” product. 164
Moreover, subjectivity is highly relevant in analyzing the potential
fraudulency of trademark application oaths. In a case before the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, California pizza company Woodstock’s
Enterprises, Inc. alleged that an Oregon-based company bearing the same
name obtained its registration knowing that the mark “Woodstock’s” was
already used by the petitioner. 165 In denying the allegation, the Board noted
that application oaths are “phrased in terms of a subjective belief, thereby
making it extremely difficult to prove fraud so long as the signer had an
honestly held, good faith belief.” 166 Given a reasonably held and honest,
although incorrect, good faith belief that a party is the senior user of the
registered mark, a defendant will escape liability for trademark fraud.167
In light of seemingly well-established intent requirements for induced
infringement liability among intellectual property law, there remains
disparate treatment of subjective good faith defenses. 168 Consequently,
both patent holders and courts struggle with adequately protecting patent
rights. 169 In order to provide more transparency to the patent market, the
Supreme Court was forced to established a uniform approach to subjective,
good faith defenses. 170
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and held that a defendant’s
good faith belief regarding patent validity was not a defense to a claim of
induced infringement. 171 Relying on the long-accepted truth that “[v]alidity
and infringement are distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different
presumptions, and different evidence,” the Court declined to recognize a
good faith belief of invalidity as negating the scienter requirement for
induced infringement under Section 271(b). 172
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming the decision in GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 173 which held that, “liability for induced
164. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
165. Woodstock’s Enters. (Calif.) v. Woodstock’s Enters. (Ore.), 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440,
1443 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
166. Id. at 1444.
167. Id. at 1444–45.
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. See supra Part II.
170. See infra Part III.
171. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015).
172. Id. at 1929 (quoting Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
173. 563 U.S. 754 (2011).
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infringement can only attach if the defendant knew of the patent and knew
as well that ‘the induced acts constitute patent infringement.’”174 Contrary
to assertions made by Commil and the Government in its supporting amicus
brief, the Court emphasized that inducement liability requires a higher
mental state and thus proof that the defendant knew the acts were
infringing. 175
In light of this twofold scienter requirement, the Court then considered
whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is a defense to a claim
of induced infringement. 176 Through analysis of precedent 177 and the
organization of the Patent Act, 178 the Court determined that infringement
and validity are distinct issues; thus, “permitting a defense of belief in
invalidity . . . would conflate [the two].” 179 Moreover, the Court contended
that allowing this new defense would undermine the core presumption
presented in the Patent Act and case law that a patent is “presumed
valid.” 180 If a defendant could prevail by reasonably proving his belief in
invalidity, the Court argued, he would circumvent the high standard of clear
and convincing evidence chosen by Congress.181 Consequently, the Court
regarded invalidity as an affirmative defense to liability for otherwise
infringing conduct, not infringement itself.182
The Court also indicated several practical reasons not to create a
defense based on a good faith belief in invalidity. 183 For instance, the Court
pointed to other methods available to accused inducers wishing to
invalidate a patent, such as filing a declaratory judgment action or seeking
inter partes review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 184 In addition, the
Court claimed that the defense could render litigation more burdensome. 185
According to the Court, every accused inducer would be incentivized to put
forth a theory of invalidity, resulting in increased discovery costs and a

174. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926 (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011)).
175. Id. at 1927−28.
176. Id. at 1928.
177. See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) (“A party
seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee’s charge
of infringement.”).
178. Part III of the Act relates to “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” including the
protection from infringement, while Part II, “Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,”
defines what constitutes a valid patent. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–212,
251–329 (2012)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1929 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012)).
181. Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–47 (2011)).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007)).
185. Id.
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higher likelihood that the defendant will prevail.186 Lastly, the Court
rejected the defense in light of general principles, such as an act being
“intentional” for purposes of civil liability despite the actor lacking actual
knowledge and “that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense
to criminal prosecution.” 187
At the conclusion of its opinion, the majority stressed the importance
of dissuading frivolous claims made by companies wielding patents as “a
sword to go after defendants for money.” 188 Through safeguards outlined
by the Court, such as sanctioning attorneys and awarding fees to prevailing
parties, courts can ensure the abatement of this tactic.189 The Court argued
that these precautions, along with the other avenues available to dispute
validity, “militate in favor of maintaining the separation . . . between
infringement and validity.” 190 As such, the Court concluded that a belief in
invalidity is no defense to a claim of induced infringement.191
In dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that Section 271(b) requires
knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts but disagreed with
the majority’s holding. 192 He argued that only valid patents confer
exclusive rights susceptible to infringement. 193 Consequently, “anyone
with a good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity necessarily believes the
patent cannot be infringed” and thus lacks the scienter element necessary
for induced infringement. 194 The majority’s arguments contrary to this
position, Justice Scalia opined, were unpersuasive. 195 First, Justice Scalia
asserted that while infringement and validity are separate issues, this
distinction is irrelevant. 196 “Recognizing that infringement requires
validity” would not conflate the issues. 197 Furthermore, a defense based on
a good faith belief in invalidity would not undermine the statutory
presumption of validity. 198 An accused inducer who succeeds with this

186. Id. at 1929–30 (citing Nathan A. Sloan, Think It Is Invalid? A New Defense to Negate
Intent for Induced Infringement, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 613, 618 (2013)).
187. Id. at 1930 (first quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A.,
559 U.S. 573, 582–83 (2010); and then quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199
(1991)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1930–31 (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11; then citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); and
then citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56
(2014)).
190. Id. at 1931.
191. Id.
192. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting id. at 1928 (majority opinion)).
198. Id.
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defense, he explained, would merely escape liability, not call into question
that patent’s validity. 199
Lastly, Justice Scalia noted that the Court does not create defenses but
rather interprets the Patent Act to decide whether a defense is sound.200 The
Patent Act, Justice Scalia points out, requires knowledge of infringement
for induced infringement liability. 201 Given that “there can be no
infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid
patent[, a] good-faith belief in invalidity is a defense.” 202 Therefore, Justice
Scalia urged that proper interpretation of the Patent Act calls for the
acceptance of a good faith belief of invalidity as a viable defense to induced
infringement. 203
IV. ANALYSIS
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court found
that invalidity was a defense to liability, not to infringement. The Supreme
Court therefore held that a belief as to invalidity could not negate the
scienter required for induced infringement. 204 Although the Commil Court
reached the appropriate conclusion, its reasoning was misguided. 205 The
majority shaped its argument primarily around the structural and historical
separation of “validity” and “infringement” under patent law.206 This
tenuous distinction, however, poses logistical hurdles for courts and
scholars alike. 207
The Commil Court could have further clarified the existing intent
requirement by including the following policy rationales that support
Section 271(b). 208 Both the judiciary and the legislature have made
extensive efforts to formulate an intent requirement for induced
infringement that favors protection of patentees and the free marketplace
equally. 209 Permitting a good faith defense in invalidity would not only
obfuscate infringement claims against potential inducers but also could
permit defendants to evade liability entirely. 210 Furthermore, the policy
justifications behind induced infringement closely resemble inducement in

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1932.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1931 (majority opinion).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
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copyright and trademark law. 211 By making this correlation, the Commil
Court would have made additional strides in aligning the doctrines of
intellectual property law.212 Given the current pattern of judicial crossapplication of these doctrines, this result would facilitate the ability of
courts to seek guidance from other areas of intellectual property law. 213
With this alternative line of reasoning, the Supreme Court’s holding would
have also furnished further clarity and consistency to both patent law and
intellectual property law as a whole.214
A. The Tenuous Distinction Between “Infringement” and “Validity”
Provides a Weak Foundation for the Holding in Commil
The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in Commil, distinguishing
“infringement” and “validity” as separate issues, provided a weak
foundation for the ultimate holding. The Commil Court attempted to clarify
the “axiom” articulated by the Federal Circuit—“that one cannot infringe an
invalid patent.” 215 In doing so, the majority itself acknowledged that “[t]o
say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that someone cannot be
induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one sense a simple truth, both as
a matter of logic and semantics.”216 Nevertheless, the Court maintained that
the two issues are entirely distinct.217 This language alone reflects two
competing representations of the relationship between “infringement” and
“validity.” On one hand, as endorsed in Commil, infringement and validity
are independent claims. On the other hand, infringement logistically
presupposes the existence of a valid patent. Given the following range of
influential evidence on both sides of this argument, this controversial
distinction ultimately undermines the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
The structure of the Patent Act and prior case law demonstrate “the
long-accepted truth . . . that infringement and invalidity are separate matters
under patent law.” 218 First, the Patent Act of 1952 incorporates two
chapters, “Infringement of Patents” 219 and “Remedies for Infringement of

211. See infra Part IV.C.
212. See infra Part IV.C.
213. See generally Lorelei D. Ritchie, Is “Willful Blindness” the New “Recklessness” After
Global-Tech?, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 170 (2011).
214. See infra Part IV.C.
215. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (2015) (quoting Commil
USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 720 F. 3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
216. Id. at 1929 (citing M. Swift & Sons, Inc. v. W.H. Coe Mfg. Co., 102 F.2d 391, 396 (1st
Cir. 1939)).
217. Id. at 1928.
218. Id. (citing Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
219. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271−273 (2012).
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Patent, and Other Actions,” 220 into Part III of Title 35, “Patents and
Protection of Patent Rights.” 221 While the former chapter defines what
constitutes infringement of a patent,222 the latter chapter pertains to defenses
to liability, including those based on invalidity. 223 By separating the
statutory requirements for both, Congress presumably intended for the
issues to remain separate. Second, precedent similarly purports that the two
claims are independent, serving as “alternative grounds” for dismissing
suits. 224
Moreover, the issue of infringement is “capable of determination
without regard to its validity.” 225 To determine infringement, courts
compare the asserted patent claims, regardless of validity, to the accused
products or process. 226 Validity, however, is governed by separate tests.
Preliminarily, a patent is presumed valid; next, “the party attacking validity
has the burden of proving facts supporting a conclusion of invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence.”227 A defendant can argue invalidity on
several grounds, including anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and
insufficient description. 228 In addition, most courts consider deciding
validity and infringement independently a better practice “to avert
unnecessary remand in the event” claims are held valid on appeal.229
Consequently, “[c]ourts constantly hold claims infringed but invalid.” 230
Conversely, the Patent Act and prior case law equally demonstrate that
a finding of infringement presupposes patent validity. 231 For instance,
Section 271(b) defines induced infringement by referring to a patent being
220. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281−299 (2012).
221. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251−350 (2010).
222. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271−273 (2012).
223. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281−299 (2012).
224. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993) (“The Federal Circuit’s
decision to rely on one of two possible alternative grounds (noninfringement rather than
invalidity) did not strip it of power to decide the second question . . . .”) (emphasis added).
225. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
226. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (“Victory in
an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product
or process’ . . . .” (first quoting H. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 33 (2d ed. 1995);
and then citing 3 LIPSCOMB § 11:2, 288–90)).
227. Golf Tech, LLC v. Edens Techs., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Me. 2009) (citing
RYCO, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
228. Id.
229. Sanford Research Co. v. Eberhard Faber Pen & Pencil Co., 379 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir.
1967).
230. Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Rich, J.,
dissenting); see also CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 755 F.3d 1356, 1357−58 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[T[he case went to trial where a jury found that CEATS’s patents were infringed, but
invalid.”).
231. See, e.g., U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 205 F. Supp. 140, 148
(N.D. Ala. 1962) (“Logically, it would seem since infringement presupposes validity that validity
should be the first order of decision.”).
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infringed. 232 As implemented in Section 271, a “patent” is not merely a
paper certificate, but rather “the conferral of rights in a particular claimed
set of elements.” 233 Those rights exist under a valid patent that entitle its
holder to privileges bestowed by the Patent Act.234 This interpretation
coincides with the understanding of “infringement” in Black’s Law
Dictionary—“[a]n act that interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a
patent.” 235 In addition, the Committee on the Judiciary noted that an
explicit definition of “infringement” within the Patent Act was unnecessary
since the granting clause Section 154(a)(1) already “creates certain
exclusive rights and infringement would be any violation of those rights.”236
Both before and after the enactment of the Patent Act, courts regularly
recognized that invalidity renders patent claims void.237 In Linde Air
Products Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 the Second Circuit
asserted as a “plain principle that there can be no such thing as infringement
of an invalid patent.” 239 Almost ninety years later, the court in Prima Tek
II, LLC v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 240 upheld the same concept with regards to
induced infringement. 241 After rendering a judgment of invalidity, the
Prima Tek court, like many others, considered the cross-claim of
infringement moot. 242 Given the vastly disparate characterizations of the
relationship between validity and infringement, the Commil Court should
have placed less emphasis on the distinction and more on the underlying
policy.
B. A Good Faith Belief in Invalidity Defense Contravenes the
Purposes and Policies Underlying 35 U.S.C. Section 271(b)
Creating a new good faith belief in invalidity defense to inducement
would undermine the purposes and policies underlying Section 271(b) for
two reasons. First, a good faith belief in invalidity functions as a complete
defense. Consequently, a good faith belief deprives patent owners of a
232. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.”).
233. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014).
234. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
235. Infringement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
236. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952).
237. See, e.g., Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Publ’n Corp., 166 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir.
1948) (“[O]bviously, there can be no infringement of an invalid patent.”).
238. 246 F. 834 (2d Cir. 1917).
239. Id. at 837.
240. 412 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
241. Id. at 1291 (“[T]here can be no contributory or induced infringement of invalid patent
claims.”).
242. Id.; see also Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., 745 F.2d 621, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
issue of infringement is now moot. Durham can incur no liability for ‘infringement’ of invalid
claims.”).
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meaningful remedy against actors who game the defense by inducing third
parties to directly infringe while evading the “the actual knowledge
standard set forth in Global-Tech.” 243 Second, including yet another
subjective defense to induced infringement overextends an intent
requirement that already sufficiently protects innocent defendants.
Congress codified an indirect infringement in order “[t]o provide for
the protection of patent rights where enforcement against direct infringers is
impracticable.” 244 During the consideration of the 1952 Patent Act, primary
drafter Mr. Giles Rich explained that the practical way to stop infringement
“by a large number of scattered individuals all of whom have been caused
to infringe by the same person . . . is to sue the man who caused the
infringement, rather than the multitude.”245 In considering Commil,
however, the Supreme Court downplayed the role of Section 271(b). Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia opined, respectively, that “once you have
a few successful suits against users rather than inducers, both . . . will get
the message” and that Section 271(b) is a “supplemental cause of action.”246
This oversimplification fails to recognize that actions of induced
infringement should target “the brains of the enterprise” rather than
“innocent end user[s].” 247 A significant amount of third-party purchasers
have no real knowledge of the accused products and thus cannot adequately
defend their actions.248 Targeting manufacturers, however, resolves issues
of infringement in one comprehensive trial.249
This efficient remedy becomes obscured, however, when
manufacturers can claim a good faith belief in invalidity as a defense to the
intent requirement of induced infringement. In Global-Tech, the Supreme
Court set forth a dual standard of knowledge in which the inducer must
have knowledge that the patent exists and that the induced acts would cause

243. Laura Burton Perry, Understanding the Good-Faith Belief in Invalidity: How Commil
Has Impacted the Law of Induced Infringement, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 699, 710 (2015).
244. Contributory Infringement in Patents-Definition of Inventions: Hearings on H.R. 5988
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 21, at 15 (1948) (statement of Robert W. Byerly, Chairman, Committee
on Patents).
245. Id. at 3 (statement of Giles. S. Rich, attorney representing New York Patent Law
Association).
246. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8:11, 22:21−23, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896).
247. John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer’s Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent
Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
245, 279 (2008) (quoting Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No.
3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 82nd Cong. On H.R. 3760, 82d Cong. 160 (1951)
(statement of Giles S. Rich, primary drafter of the Patent Act)).
248. Brief of Petitioner at 33, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)
(No. 13-896).
249. Id. at 34.
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infringement. 250 In factoring a good faith belief in invalidity into its intent
analysis, the Federal Circuit in Commil devised a conflicting holding that
would prove onerous for patentees. The Federal Circuit held that such a
defense would negate the requisite intent for induced infringement but
would not preclude a finding of induced infringement. 251
Following the lower court’s decision, several courts attempted to apply
what seemed like an absolute bar to liability. For example, in Halo
Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc., 252 the district court stated that a
good faith belief in invalidity does not preclude a finding of induced
infringement. 253 Nevertheless, the court ultimately deemed proper jury
instructions that clearly stated that the defendant could not be liable for
inducement if he believed the patents were invalid.254 Halo indicates that
the Federal Circuit in Commil effectively created a loophole from the
Global-Tech knowledge requirement that eliminates culpability of an
infringer.
In light of this ambiguity, patent holders faced with this defense would
have difficulty proving that a defendant’s alleged good faith belief was not
truly genuine. Much like in Halo, accused inducers would argue to the jury
that even if a patent is valid, a belief in invalidity prevents liability. Despite
parallel litigations and ex parte reexaminations by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) confirming a patent’s validity,
defendants maintain an opportunity to avoid punishment. Moreover,
already crippled by “a slew of defenses including non-infringement,
multiple grounds of invalidity . . . and various equitable defenses,”
patentees would also confront a defense of a good faith belief of invalidity
based on opinion from counsel. 255 Without insight into a defendant’s
subjective knowledge, a patent holder can never truly ascertain whether
such reliance was held in good faith.
As described supra in Part II.A.2, the intent requirement of induced
infringement balances “the public’s access to non-infringing uses of
products against the patent owner’s right to a remedy when the use is
infringing.” 256 By stipulating a two-part standard that requires both
knowledge of the patent and intent to cause a third party to directly infringe,
250. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
251. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368−69 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
252. No. 2:07-CV-00331-PMP, 2013 WL 4458754 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2013).
253. Id. at *6.
254. Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00331-PMP, WL 4458754,
at *18 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2013). The relevant jury instructions stated: “If you find that Pulse was
aware of the patents, but believed the acts it encouraged did not infringe the patents, or that the
patents were invalid, Pulse cannot be liable for inducement.” Id. at *18−19.
255. Brief of Petitioner at 41, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)
(No. 13-896).
256. Id. at 43.
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Section 271(b) provides patent holders protection from induced
infringement, yet forces them to meet a higher standard of proof to
demonstrate culpability. In overruling Henry, 257 the Supreme Court limited
the scope of exclusive rights to the invention and processes described in the
patent. This decision enabled the public to use unpatented components or
engage in the sale of products equally capable of infringing or noninfringing uses without retribution. 258 To effectuate this outcome, the intent
requirement ensures that patent holders cannot capitalize on mere “misuse”
of a product.
Instead, patent holders must demonstrate that the
manufacturer or supplier had actual knowledge of their infringing
actions. 259
Incorporating a defense of good faith belief in invalidity into induced
infringement proceedings disrupts this carefully formulated balance in favor
of potential infringers. As evidenced by precedent culminating in the
Global-Tech standard, culpability for induced infringement flows from
actual knowledge of infringement, not mere misuse. 260 A defense of
subjective belief in invalidity would insulate from liability defendants who
admit to knowledge of both the patent and infringing behavior. Under this
approach, however, defendants with good faith, but mistaken beliefs in
invalidity, would proceed with otherwise illegal action in the hope that the
patent is invalid. Moreover, the new defense “only serve[s] to limit the
rights of patentees with valid patents and meritorious claims.” 261 In
circumstances where a patent has withstood all challenges of invalidity and
unenforceability, and a patentee has proved both direct infringement by
third parties and intentional inducement by a defendant who had knowledge
of the patent, the defendant can nevertheless escape liability by invoking
this defense. This would be nearly impossible to overcome.
C. Engaging in a Cross-Application of Protectability Doctrines
Provides Clarity for Future Intellectual Property Adjudications
Given the merits of aligning patent law with copyright and trademark
jurisprudence, the Commil Court could have drawn a correlation between
the policy rationales set forth under each body of law. Although the
Supreme Court incorporated analogies of tortious interference and criminal
law, they did so “[a]s a final note” and without a nod to patent law’s sisters,
257. See supra notes 60−61 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932−33 (2005) (“[T]he
doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as
unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that
some of one’s products will be misused.”).
259. See supra Part II.B.2.
260. Id.
261. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 23, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920
(2015) (No. 13-896).
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copyright and trademark. 262 This omission is particularly troublesome in
light of Global-Tech’s reliance on the Grokster copyright opinion. Had the
Commil Court made such connections, the resulting opinion would have
been bolstered by uniformity and consistency.
Patent, trademark, and copyright law share common legislative and
historical origins in the United States. For instance, patent and copyright
law appear “hand-in-hand in the Constitution and Congress enacted the first
patent and copyright acts in 1790.” 263 Patent and trademark law similarly
are both adjudicated by the USPTO and Federal Circuit. 264 Given this
“historic kinship,” 265 courts frequently engage in cross-application of
doctrines within each discipline. In the 2006 decision eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC., 266 the Supreme Court endorsed this practice by
“discard[ing] nearly a century of patent precedent [concerning viability of
presumptive injunctions] in favor of a better standard articulated in
copyright law.” 267
Continuing the cross-application of intellectual property doctrines will
ultimately balance the various incentives of right holders and the free
marketplace. Past examples of courts applying one doctrine of intellectual
property to another include cases of contributory infringement, 268 misuse, 269
and first sale. 270 Given its importance, protectability should similarly “be
examined in a unified and functional fashion across [the laws], rather than
as separate regimes.” 271 Determining protectability of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks “is the key to whether particular works can reap the benefits
of intellectual property protection and, correspondingly, whether the
availability of protection will encourage the production of such works in the
262. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).
263. Ritchie, supra note 213, at 170 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
264. Id.
265. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (“The
closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.” (first citing United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); then citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 131 (1932); and then citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657–58 (1834))).
266. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
267. Ritchie, supra note 213, at 171 (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 430 (1908)).
268. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)
(applying the concept of contributory infringement in patent law to copyright law for the
imposition of vicarious liability).
269. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
that a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent
defense is inherent in patent law).
270. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the first-sale doctrine limits all three principal forms of intellectual property rights).
271. Id. at 1448 n.8 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information
Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent Law into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property,
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 221−23).
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first instance.” 272 Therefore, the Commil holding would have benefitted
from the cross-application of trademark and copyright protectability
doctrines to patent law.
In Commil, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to create such a
unified regime in clarifying the intent requirement and applicable defenses
for induced infringement. The Commil Court initiated its analysis with a
reaffirmation of the intent standard articulated in Global-Tech, a decision
aided in large part by the previously discussed copyright case Grokster.273
Settling on a two-part knowledge requirement for copyright infringement,
Grokster distinguished mere knowledge of infringing potential and ordinary
acts incident to product distribution from purposeful, culpable conduct. In
doing so, the Supreme Court ensured that the inducement rule would do
“nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation
having a lawful promise.” 274 The Commil Court should have, in addition to
its structural analysis of the Patent Act, invoked policy rationales to better
align the purposes of intellectual property law.275
V. CONCLUSION
In Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that the requisite intent for induced infringement liability cannot be negated
by a good faith belief in invalidity. 276 At the outset of its opinion, the Court
purposefully reiterated its prior holding in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A. 277 Induced patent infringement, the Court emphasized, demands a
higher mental state in which the defendant knew of the patent, and that the
induced acts constitute infringement. 278 Without proof of this dual
knowledge, liability cannot attach.279 After this introduction, however, the
Commil Court strayed from the significance of the intent requirement under
Section 271(b), choosing instead to expound on the contentious distinction
between “validity” and “infringement.” 280
The Court could have bolstered its reasoning by reinforcing and
advancing the policy rationales underlying Section 271(b). Permitting a
good faith defense in patent invalidity would disrupt not only the carefully
formulated marketplace balance of rights but also the cross-application of
272. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1442
(2010) (citing Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It’s an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s
Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189–90 (2005)).
273. See supra Part II.B.2.
274. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005).
275. See supra Part IV.B.
276. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015).
277. Id. at 1926.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1928.
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intellectual property doctrines by courts. Applying the protectability
mechanisms of trademark and copyright law to induced patent infringement
would facilitate a uniform standard of intent that would guide courts in
future adjudications. 281 Given this alternative analysis, the Commil holding
could have promoted both clarification of the intent requirement and
increased protectability within the intellectual property market, resulting in
a decision truly made in good faith.282

281. See supra Part IV.
282. Id.

